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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
or social or economic status4 6 a member of the excluded class may cog-
ently attack his conviction by such a jury on the grounds that he was
denied equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.47 Furthermore, when the administration of any jury selec-
tion procedure has resulted in the exclusion of such a class for similar
reasons it is open to attack as violative of the due process clause.
Finally, where the state prescribes a dual jury system, clear and con-
vincing evidence showing a greatly disparate ratio of conviction by the
special as compared with the general jury for a substantial length
of time prior to trial may be used to prove the procedure violative of
the equal protection clause and unconstitutional.
DAVID W. KETLEa*
Limitations on an Accused's Right to Counsel
In the recent case of Foster v. IlLinois,' the United States Supreme
Court held that it is not a violation of due process to permit an accused
in a state criminal action to plead guilty without previously being
advised by counsel.2 The defendants had been indicted and arraigned
on charges of burglary and larceny,3 and were not advised of their right
to counsel, though the court cautioned them of the consequences of a
plea of guilty and informed them of their right to a trial.4 Inasmuch
as it is now generally the law in the United States, both in federal and
state criminal proceedings, that an accused is entitled to the assistance
of counsel, 5 the case presents three interesting problems viz.: (a) must
the defendant in a federal criminal action have the advice of'counsel
before entering a plea of guilty; (b) when will a plea of guilty without
the assistance of counsel in a criminal action in a state court be consid-
ered as in violation of due process; (c) assuming that the defendant in
a criminal case has the right to advice of counsel when entering a
plea of guilty, under what circumstances is he deemed to have waived
such right?
46 Note (1947) 60 Harv. L. R. 613.
47 In the Fay case the convictions were affirmed primarily because petitioners
failed to convince the majority by clear and convincing proofs that the county clerk
systematically and deliberately excluded the laboring class from the special jury
panel.
* Appreciation is expressed for the assistance rendered by Robert Lindquist, senior
law student of Northwestern University.
1 ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1716 (1947).
2 Const. of the U. S. (1787) Am. Art. XI-V, § 1.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, c. 38, §§ 65, 796; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, c. 38, §§ 84, 802.
4 394 Ill. 194, 68 N. E. (2d) 252 (1947).
5 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); People v. Cooper, 366 Ill. 113, 7 N. E.




The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees that
an accused shall have the assistance of counsel "for his defense,"' 6 but
the Sixth Amendment has application only to criminal prosecutions in
the federal courts, and not to state criminal actions. 7 In Johnson v.
Zerbst8 the safeguards offered an accused in a federal criminal case
were firmly established, and the doctrine formulated therein has been
incorporated in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.9 In that case
the petitioners were indicted and convicted in a United States District
Court for uttering and passing counterfeit money. They neither had
knowledge of, nor were they advised of their right to counsel. On writ
of habeas corpus the United States Supreme Court held that in a federal
criminal proceeding the right to counsel is "fundamental," and imposes
a duty on a federal judge to advise an uninformed defendant of his
constitutional right. Failure of a federal court to provide counsel for
an indigent, illiterate, or mentally incompetent defendant was held to
be grounds for reversal of a conviction.
In a federal case the right of an accused to assistance of counsel
applies in both capital and non-capital cases.10 Counsel must be pro-
vided at the preliminary hearing, on arraignment, or at whatever stage
of the proceedings where a plea is effected." When an accused enters
a plea without counsel, and he has not voluntarily waived his right to
counsel, then such a plea is void.' 2 The nature of the plea, whether it
be guilty, 13 or not guilty,1" is of no significance.
The Fourteenth Amendment contains no express provision regarding
the right to counsel, and though the guarantees offered an accused in a
state criminal action are not so comprehensive as those embodied in the
Sixth Amendment,15 it has been interpreted to mean that a defendant
6 Const. of the U. S. (1787) Am. Art. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the
state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense."
7 Gaines v. Washington, 277 U. S. 81 (1928); Pay v. New York, ... U. S.
67 S. Ct. 1613 (1947).
8 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
9 Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 44, following 18 U. S. C. A. 687, 54 Stat. 688
(1940).
10 Const. of the U. S. (1787) Am. Art. VI. Cited note 6 supra.
11 Wood v. United States (App. D. C. 1942) 128 P. (2d) 265. (Defendants were
charged with robbery. At the preliminary hearing they were without counsel, and
entered pleas of guilty. Eleven days later, upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty.
Court held that the constitutional right to counsel embraced the right to have counsel
at the preliminary hearing.) Evans v. Rives (App. D. C. 1942) 126 P. (2d) 633
(1942). (Accused charged with crime of non-support of a minor. Appeared in
Juvenile Court without counsel, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. Had a fourth-
grade education, and no knowledge of right to counsel. Held on appeal that "the
constitutional guarantee of right to counsel makes no distinction between the ar-
raignment and other stages of criminal proceedings.)
12 Bayless v. Johnston, Warden, 127 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942). (If the
requirement to assistance of counsel is not complied with, a plea of guilty is invalid,
because the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. "The judgment of convic-
tion pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned there-
under may obtain release by habeas corpus.")
13 Walker v. Johnston, Warden, 312 U. S. 275 (1941).
14 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
15 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
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in a state case shall be provided rights essential to a fair hearing. 16 The
great majority of states by statute, constitutional provision, or judicial
decision insure defendants in capital and non-capital cases the right
to counsel. A few states have adopted the textual provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, but most states provide for counsel in non-capital cases
only on request.17 In two states, however, the requirement of counsel
in non-capital cases has been affirmatively rejected.'
8
It is well-established that in capital cases it is the duty of the court,
irrespective of request, to assign counsel for an indigent defendant,19
and to advise an uninformed defendant of his right to counsel.20 But
in Betts v. Brady,21 it was conclusively decided that there is no funda-
mental right to counsel in every criminal ease in a state court. The
petitioner was indicted for robbery, and his request was denied on
grounds that Maryland law only requires assistance of counsel in a
capital case. Though he had little education, he was permitted to
conduct his own defense. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction, holding that in non-capital cases where the accused is of
ordinary intelligence, due process does not require the assistance of
counsel as a fundamental right unless it is expressly conferred by state
statute or constitutional provision. In the few states, however, where
an accused is not entitled to counsel in non-capital cases, if it is evident
under all of the- circumstances that an indigent defendant is handicapped
by a lack of legal assistance, a judgment of conviction will be reversed.22
The primary reason for the distinction between capital and non-capital
cases finds its foundation in the common law and the policy of the thir-
teen original states with respect to the right to counsel. Under the
common law the assistance of counsel was expressly denied an accused.
When the thirteen states adopted their respective Constitutions, they
provided that counsel was not to be denied a defendant, but did not
declare that the State had an affirmative duty to provide counsel when
the defendant was unable to procure one.23 The United States Supreme
Court, out of deference to this state policy and yet with an awareness
of the severity of a judgment of conviction in many criminal cases,
decided that it would be advisable to take the position that only where
death is the penalty should the accused be provided counsel.
24
Where assistance of counsel in non-capital cases is provided for by
statute or constitutional provision, a denial of such right after an accused
has requested counsel, would be regarded as a denial of due process.25
Failure to inform a defendant of his right to counsel before he enters
a plea in a non-capital case is a violation of due process in those states
which have adopted guarantees textually identical with those embodied
16 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 (1934).
17 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 477 (1941) for a comprehensive index of
statutes on this subject.
18 Gilley v. State, 114 Tex. Crim. Rep. 548, 26 S. W. (2d) 1070 (1930); Coates v.
State, 180 Md. 502, 25 A. (2d) 676 (1942).
19 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444
(1940) ; People v. Kurant, 331 Ill. 470, 163 N. E. 411 (1928).
20 Polk v. State, 26 Okla. Crim. Rep. 283, 224 P. 194 (1924).
21 316 U. S. 455 (1941). Accord: Gall v. Brady, 39 F. Supp. 504, (D. Md. 1941).
22 Coates v. State, 180 Md. 502, 25 A. (2d) 676 (1942).
23 Chitty, Criminal Law (5th Am. Ed.) Vol. I, pg. 406.
24 Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1941).
25 House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1944).
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in the Sixth Amendment.26  However, there is no affirmative duty in
the majority of states to advise of, or provide counsel in non-capital
cases because, as it has been noted, it is only when the defendant requests
counsel that he is entitled to it in non-capital cases.27 Nevertheless, in
some states it has been established by statute and decision that it is the
duty of the court, in all cases when defendant is without counsel, to
admonish him of the consequences of his plea before accepting it.28
It is a fundamental rule of law that the constitutional right of an
accused to assistance of counsel may be waived. 29 A waiver is an inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.
The broad formula used in the federal cases to determine whether a
valid waiver has been effected is simply that it must be knowingly and
intelligently made, and this is determined only by weighing the par-
ticular facts and circumstances of each case, including the background,
experience and conduct of the accused.8 0 A waiver will not be implied
from the fact that the accused pleads guilty,3 1 unless he has knowledge
of his right to counsel and indicates that he does not desire counsel.
3 2
If a defendant is coerced or deceived by the court or prosecutor into
waiving his constitutional right to counsel, a plea of guilty will be set
aside.
33
In the state cases, an expressed waiver by the defendant of his right
to counsel is not sufficient unless it appears conclusively that it was
intelligently made, and with an awareness of the consequences.3 4 A few
states will not imply a waiver of counsel from a plea of guilty but re-
quire by statute that the accused sign a written statement relinquishing
his right.35 In a capital case, because it is the duty of a state court to
inform the accused of his legal rights, a waiver will not be implied from
the fact that the accused failed to request counsel, but in non-capital
cases in the states which provide counsel only on request, the silence of
the accused in not requesting counsel is regarded as a waiver.3 6  When
an accused lacks age or intelligence and is incapable of making an ade-
26 State v. Jameson, ... S. D ... , 22 N. W. (2d) 731 (1946); State v. Murphy,
248 Wis. 433 (1945).
27 Rowland v. State, 35 S. E. (2d) 372, 72 Ga. App. 793 (1945).
28 People v. Cooper, 366 Ill. 113, 7 N. E. (2d) 882 (1937). (The accused was
arrested for disorderly conduct at a primary election, pleaded guilty without the offer
or advice of counsel, and without the court explaining the consequences of his plea
to him in accordance with statute, and sentenced to one year imprisonment. The Ill.
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction. Yet, in a review of the case
under consideration, the same court affirmed a like conviction. The only distinction
that can be determined from the records of the two cases is that in the principal
case the lower court complied with its affirmative duty of informing the accused of
the consequences of their pleas of guilty. In neither case were instructions given
regarding the assistance of counsel.)
29 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 (1941); State v. Garcia, 47 N. M. 319, 142
P. (2d) 552 (1943).
30 Williams v. Huff, (App. D. C. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 91.
31 Robinson v. Johnston, (App. D. C. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 774; Parker v. Johnston,
(App. D. C. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 829 (1939); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945).
32 Erwin v. Sanford, (App. D. C. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 892.
33 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1934).
34 People v. Foster, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 477 (1945).
35 Davis v. Hudspeth, 161 Kan. 354, 167 P. (2d) 293 (1946).
36 People v. McEchaney, 394 Ill. 380, 68 N. E. (2d) 715 (1946).
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